Author: Adam.Steedman.Thake

Deadliest Warrior – a television programme which anachronistically pits historical soldiers against one another to find out who would ‘win’ – attests to the appeal of such discussions. A new work has analysed the power of European militaries in the Early Modern period when they came up against their Asian contemporaries. Heated debate over the respective prowess of European soldiers and those from other parts of the world has a very long history. European pamphlets printed in the seventeenth century debated the potential impact of Japanese mercenaries. Some were impressed by the prowess and valour of Japanese warriors; others praised European soldiers for their skill and organisation. In historical circles this debate is scaled up. Individual soldiers are not compared, but armies and navies can be discussed with regard to a central historical question: Did European countries possess a significant military advantage that armies in Asia, the Americas, and elsewhere could not match? This question is important as it could offer an explanation for what is called the “rise of the West.” In an attempt to provide an answer, Adam Clulow, a historian from Monash University, Melbourne, Australia, has assessed the scholarship surrounding this debate. His work is published in the most recent edition of History Compass. Traditionally, it is thought that early modern European powers underwent an unprecedented military revolution. The resultant technological advances – particularly the capital ship, infantry firepower, and the artillery fortress – transformed the continent; leading to a dramatic shift in the power balance between Europe and the rest of the world. It was these tools which allowed Europeans to conquer over 35% of the world by 1800. This model of European expansion, however, has been hotly debated. Many opponents of this model claim that there was not a significant lag between the supposed ‘European military juggernaut,’ as Clulow puts it, and other parts of the world. Military organisation in Europe, therefore, should not be seen as exceptional. New research has forged a middle ground between these two positions. By looking at the Sino-Dutch war (1661-1668), it is possible to see a ‘limited advantage template.’ Clulow states that this conflict allows us to see that “while Europeans did possess a genuine technological advantage, most notably in forts and ships, it was not nearly as expansive as is sometimes assumed by supporters of the military revolution thesis.” Clulow, an expert on Tokugawa Japan, also notes that Europe had not always been able to fully utilise its technological advantages. European powers were unable to use maritime violence against Japan, for example. One reason for this was that the overseas resources the European forces were able to muster were simply not enough to challenge the regime of Tokugawa Japan. “The result was that the potential impact of superior military technology was so consistently blunted that it was essentially eliminated from the equation,” Clulow remarks. Technological advances can often give a military force a decisive upper hand in a conflict. Deadlier weapons and stronger armour are of obvious benefit in a fight. These advantages, however, are only useful if they can be effectively deployed. Clulow’s work clearly shows that rather than overestimate the importance of technology, we should remain cautious in drawing assumptions. Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons user: Trzęsacz www.onlinelibrary.wiley.com]]>